Del Trotskismo al Centrismo: Historia de la IV Internatcional 1933-53

Theses on the Anti-Imperialist United Front (1986)

Tesis sobre el Frente Unico Antiimperialista (1986)

1956: The Hungarian Revolution

Vor 55 Jahren: Die Revolution der ungarischen ArbeiterInnen wird in Blut ertränkt

 

Published by the Movement for a Revolutionary Communist International (predecessor organization of the Revolutionary Communist International Tendency) in 1987, www.thecommunist.net

 

 

 

The overthrow of Marcos, the growth of Sinn Fein, the struggle of the Tamils for Eelam all involve a conflict with imperialist or a fight for bourgeois democratic demands rights. These theses of the MRCI outline the tactics of communists towards non-proletarian classes in this struggle.

 

1. The tactics of communists in relation to bourgeois and petit-bourgeois led movements coming into struggle with imperialism was outlined in essence at the Second Congress of the Communist International (CI). Lenin's theses put forward the possibility of forming an 'alliance' with these forces on two conditions. One, that they were in practice leading a struggle against imperialism and two, that such an alliance placed no restrictions on the communist's independent activity aimed at organising the workers and peasants against imperialism. The theses sowed no illusions in either the willingness or the ability of the 'national revolutionary' movement i.e. the bourgeoisie, to take the struggle through to the end, to break the stranglehold of imperialism. They emphasised that 'a determined fight' needed to be waged against painting these movements in communist colours. Independence of propaganda, organisation and action was necessary because the national bourgeoisie would vacillate and compromise in the struggle against imperialism.

 

2. The tactic of the united front in the colonial and semi colonial world was developed more fully at the Fourth Congress of the CI. Its development was part of the discussion and elaboration of the united front tactic undertaken between the Third and Fourth Congresses, in particular in relation to the social democratic parties and their trade unions in Europe. In the period directly after the Russian Revolution and during the revolutionary crisis which gripped Europe after World War I there was little stimulus to develop the Bolsheviks' 1917 practise into generally applicable tactics for the CI, since the mass influence of the social democratic leaderships appeared to be on the point of collapse. As Trotsky said 1f we consider the party is on the eve of the conquest of power and working class will follow it, then the question of the united front does not arise.' Within the CI the creation of communist parties, the building of soviets and the armed insurrection were the tasks central to a revolutionary situation. By 1921, however, it was clear that this revolutionary situation had passed. Capitalism, aided and assisted by the treacherous social democratic and labour leaders, had managed a temporary stabilisation. Recognising the changed situation and the strength of reformism in Western Europe, CI launched the united front tactic at the Third Congress under the slogan 'to the masses'. After this Congress the ECCI developed the tactics that became known as the united front.

 

3. The workers' united front was a tactic, or a series of related tactics, aimed at winning the mass of the working class to revolutionary communism, to the programme of the revolutionary party and for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Not through propaganda alone but through action, and in struggle:

 

'Only by leading the concrete struggles of the proletariat and by taking them forward will the communists really be able to win the broad proletarian masses to the struggle for dictatorship.' (Theses on Tactics 3rd Congress).

 

As a tactic the united front was subordinate to this strategic goal. To turn the united front from a tactic to a strategy, where bringing it into being (or its maintenance once achieved) becomes the perpetual long term goal, can only lead to the liquidation of the revolutionary programme; a necessary consequence of the continuation of a long term alliance with the non-revolutionary parties or organisation.

 

4. Not withstanding the common method of the united front which underpins both the workers united front and the anti-imperialist united front (AIUF), there are important differences between them. The workers united front in the imperialist nation rests on the unity in action of the workers organisations and their parties. Communists fight within such united fronts, however limited, to develop the demands of the common struggle, through the use of transitional demands, to a struggle to overthrow capitalism. This necessitates the fight to develop the united front, in acute periods of class struggle, into soviets and the struggle for the workers government. The AIUF however develops on the terrain of minimum or democratic demands-the struggle against imperialist domination, for national independence and unity, for democracy and democratic rights. Into this struggle it seeks to draw, not only the workers' organisation, but those of the petit-bourgeoisie – the organisations especially of the peasantry, the small urban property holders, the professionals, teachers etc-and even sections or elements of the national bourgeoisie itself, where ever the latter is compelled to resist imperialism by the pressure of the masses. The fight by communists to win the workers, poor peasants and the urban petit-bourgeoisie to the perspective of socialist revolution, to transform the struggle for democracy and against imperialism into a struggle against capitalism and for the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the extent that it is successful, must break up and replace the AIUP. The fight to win the masses from the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois leaders and their parties, the struggle to create workers soviets in the towns and soviets of poor peasants and agricultural proletarians in the countryside, is part of the struggle for a workers and peasants government; a government where the peasants have been broken from their bourgeois and petit-bourgeois leaders and won to the support of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

 

5. The united front by its very nature is a temporary agreement. Nine times out of ten, where there exists no especially favourable relation of forces or political situation, the reformist or nationalist leaders will refuse it and do their utmost to prevent their rank and file from participating. Where it is struck it will be around clear, precise and limited objects of real struggle. Its primary aim is not to produce joint propaganda (if it did it would be a propaganda bloc not a united front) but agitation around the action goals of the united front.

 

6. The Communist International made clear that the united front was not just an 'appeal to leaders'; even less was it a proposal for a purely parliamentary combination or bloc:

 

The united front means the association of all workers, whether communist, anarchist, social democrat, independent or non-party, or even Christian workers, against the bourgeoisie. With the leaders if they want it so, without the leaders if they remain indifferently aside, and in defiance of the leaders and against the leaders if they sabotage the workers united front.' (ECCI April 1922)

 

Thus the appeal for the united front was both from 'above and below'. But, 'the real success of the united front depends on a movement "from below", from the rank and file of the working masses' (Theses on Tactics 4th Congress).

 

7. The striking of the united front does not for one moment mean agreeing to end criticism. For the CI there were to be no diplomatic silences or glossing over of past or present vacillation and betrayals by the reformist leaders. Communists within the united front;

 

‘While accepting a basis for action must retain the unconditional right and possibility of expressing their opinion of the policy of all working class organisations without exception, not only before and after the action is taken but also if necessary during its course. In no circumstances can these rights be surrendered.' (ECCI December 1921) Further more to maintain the united front in a bloc with reformist leaders during or after a betrayal in action, would be to become complicit in it. If it is important to know when to make a united front, it is equally important to know when to break it and thus issue an immediate warning to the rank and file workers that treachery is afoot.

 

8. The type of organisation appropriate to the united front is an organ of struggle not of propaganda for a programme. As such, a trade union is in one sense a united front. More correctly a united front creates ad hoc fighting bodies commensurate to the task in hand. These may be strike committees, councils of action and at the highest level soviets. Such bodies, vital for the struggle, strengthen the pressure on the reformist leaders to 'break with the bourgeoisie'. A united front can therefore take many forms, it can be extremely episodic-for a single demonstration, rally, strike---or it can be of a 'higher' form, involving a series of actions and agreements-a military bloc, a rank and file opposition in the trade unions like the British 'Minority Movement' of the 1920's. Whatever form it takes, it is a block for action in defence of working class interests, in which the communists neither boycott nor submerge their own programme, and they 'march separately, strike together'.

 

9. The united front is not limited to defensive trade union or extra-parliamentary struggles. It is taken on to the electoral arena where reformist parties dominate the working class. It also takes up the question of government and governmental demands. The resolution on tactics at the Fourth Congress makes clear that the slogan for a workers' government 'is an inevitable consequence of the united front tactic'. The partial struggles of the working class inevitably run up against the structures of the capitalist state, against the government of the day and its policies. The communists have to provide society wide answers to the problems facing workers, they place demands on the workers' leaders, put forward a programme for a workers' government. But these are not just left as demands; they are fought for within the rank and file of the working class belonging to all workers' parties and none, in a united front struggle to implement them via workers' control in the factories, through the fight for soviets, via the general strike etc.

 

10. The basis of the anti-imperialist united front rests on the clash of interests between the peoples of the imperialised countries and the imperialist bourgeoisie. Imperialism promotes industrial development in the imperialised countries but in a stunted and lopsided form. The imperialist banks and monopolies dominate their economies, extracting super-profits in the form of repatriated profits and usurious interest payments on loans. They impose their constrictions on the economies through the imperialist agencies such as the IMP, World Bank, etc, and inevitably because of the impossibility of imposing such exactions democratically over any period, in alliance with the most reactionary elements tied to imper­ialism-the military hierarchy and landed oligarchy. The demand for 'independent economic development', for alleviation from debt, for state capitalist industrialisation, protectionism, land reform, and constitutional democracy, reflects the needs of those sections of the bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie which suffer most from the straight jacket of imperialist domination. These demands can lead to episodic clashes between the bourgeoisie of the semi­ colony and the imperialist bourgeoisie (or its agents within the country) as in the case of the struggle against Somoza in Nicaragua.

 

11. However, because of the weakness of the bourgeoisie in the semi-colonial world, the degree to which important sections of it are tied economically to imperialist capital itself, and most importantly, because of its fear of the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses, which threatens its own rule as well as that of the imperialists, the national bourgeoisie only exceptionally leads or throws its weight behind serious struggles against imperialism. As a result in many countries in the twentieth century the leadership of the anti-imperialist movements has fallen to the petit­ bourgeoisie. But in the vast majority of cases its programme has remained faithful to that of the bourgeoisie despite the attempt to delude the workers by cloaking itself in socialist or communist colours - Nyrere's 'African Socialism', Mugabe and the Ethiopian Derg's 'Marxism-Leninism', the FSLN's Sandinism, etc.

 

12. Where the bourgeoisie or sections of it, or the petit­ bourgeoisie, enters into a struggle with imperialism it is obliged to draw and lean on the mass of workers and peasants. In such cases it is the duty of communists to enter such a struggle alongside these forces. The anti ­imperialist united front aims to break the hold of the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois nationalists over the masses, in struggle. The communists neither stand aside in a sectarian fashion nor do they hide their criticisms of these leaderships or the goals for which they struggle. Unlike the popular front which is a cross class coalition subordinating the interests of the working class to the programme of the bourgeoisie, the AIUF confines itself to concrete joint actions, specific agreements which take forward the struggle against the imperialists, within which the communists retain both freedom of criticism and propaganda. Such united fronts, given the compromising role of the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois nationalist, are likely to be extremely episodic and temporary. There is no question of tailoring the slogans of struggle to those considered acceptable to the bourgeoisie, let alone 'reserving a seat' in the united front.

 

13. The conclusions Trotsky drew for the International Left Opposition from the Chinese revolution of 1923-7 were not that the tactic of the AIUF had to be abandoned but that its opportunist distortion led to disaster. Under the leadership of Bukharin and Stalin the tactic had been gutted of its revolutionary content The Chinese Communist Party abandoned its independence and submerged itself inside the bourgeois Koumintang (KMI). It had, under the guidance of the Comintern painted up the KMT leadership in communist colours, lauding its anti-imperialist credentials and abandoning all criticism of it. It had boycotted the demands of the workers and peasants which threatened to rupture its alliance with the bourgeoisie. It had turned the AIUF into a popular front which delivered the Chinese proletariat into the hands of the counter-revolution.

 

14. Stalin and Bukharin were aided in this by the lack of clarity of the governmental slogans put forward by the CI in its discussions of the AIUF tactic. The Chinese revolution proved the slogan of the 'Revolutionary Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Peasantry' not only redundant but capable of being perverted into a call for a separate bourgeois stage of the revolution. In this sense, in Trotsky's words, the slogan became a 'noose' hung round the neck of the proletariat. It implied that a bourgeois solution to the struggle against imperialism was the goal which the proletariat fought for with the united front. The Chinese events reaffirmed the necessity of the perspective of the permanent revolution, the struggle for soviets and the workers and peasants government Such a perspective does not mean that the AIUF can only be struck around such demands. In periods of defeat or where the masses are emerging from long periods of dictatorship, the united front may well be agreed around democratic demands, rights of free speech and demonstration, release of all political prisoners etc. The fight for a democratic constituent assembly can become an important goal of an AIUF where it is part of the struggle to overthrow an imperialist backed dictatorship. The fight for the expropriation of the landowners and for an agrarian revolution would figure centrally in the struggle for such an assembly in most parts of the imperialised world. The fight for these demands are above all conducted to strengthen the independence of the working class and its organisations alongside those of the peasants-via demonstrations, strikes, committees of struggle, soviet type organisations, etc.

 

15. The AIUF in no way implies giving support to so called 'anti-imperialist governments'. Communists give no support to bourgeois governments. We support any serious action of such governments taken against imperialist interests, e.g. the nationalisations or expropriations of imperialist holdings. Communists would support and participate in military actions taken against imperialism i.e. in Nicaragua against the contras and US advisors, in Argentina against Britain in the Malvinas, fighting in such a struggle for the arming of the workers, for democratically controlled workers militias. Similarly where the political struggle reaches the stage of civil war against a dictatorship, communists might enter a military united front, whenever possible as an independent armed force accepting a common discipline in battle, making agreements under a common discipline. Aiming to strike a united front around common goals of struggle-immediate elections to a constituent assembly, legalisation of trade unions and strikes, etc. We recognise that military blocs are one form of the united front-a form not qualitatively different to united action for political goals, 'war is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means'. When we call for the military victory of such movements as the FMLN, FSLN, etc, fighting against imperialism, its agents or a dictatorship, normally a slogan raised where the civil war or revolutionary crisis has reached a decisive stage, we are not endorsing the victory of their political programme. Within such a united front we struggle for our programme, to break the workers and peasants from the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois leaderships and enter onto the road of struggle for a workers and peasants' government

 

16. It is therefore not permissible to give the AIUF in a governmental form since the proletariat cannot share with bourgeois forces the goal of a common government. While we can join a common struggle for the convening of a constituent assembly along with petit-bourgeois and even bourgeois forces, our governmental slogan remain the workers and peasants' government. No bourgeoisie will tolerate a genuine working class government i.e. one that rests upon the armed workers and serves their immediate and historic interests, and the proletariat must under no circumstances support a government of its own exploiters. Any government which claims to be 'above classes' or to represent 'the people as a whole' is a deception. The proletariat can indeed defend or seek to bring about a democratic regime, utilising democratic slogans insofar as these mobilise for a struggle against dictatorship and for the rights of the workers, poor peasants and the oppressed petit-­bourgeoisie. But such struggles and slogans should never be erected into a self-contained or self-limiting stage. Soviets must replace the freest parliament, and the workers' dictatorship the democratic republic. From the moment that democratic liberties have been won-de facto as well as de jure - they become an arena for the proletariat's struggle for power.

 

 

 

 

Note by the Editor: The following article has been published by the predecessor organization of the RCIT (the League for a Revolutionary Communist International; later renamed into League for the Fifth International) in 2006. The founding cadres of the RCIT have been expelled from the LFI in 2011 when the protested against the centrist degeneration of this organization.

 

 

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In mid-October 1956 students in Szeged marched for the right to form their own organisation independent of party control. They also struck against the compulsory learning of Russian. The students of Budapest’s Technological University followed with a demonstration on the 23 October in solidarity with Poland.

 

The 23 October demonstration was the spark that lit the Hungarian revolution. The government asked the leaders of the Petofi circle, a discussion circle led by members of the Communist Party’s youth organisation that had been banned just a few months earlier, to lead the demonstration.

 

Balazs Nagy (later known as the Trotskyist Michel Vargas) said: “At this time, and subsequently also, the Petofi circle curbed rather than encouraged the movement, considering that the hastening of events could lead to a catastrophe."

 

From 1953 the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party was split between Matyas Rakosi, the leader since the Stalinists came to power after the war, and Imre Nagy who wanted to pursue a policy called the New Course, which called for greater spending on consumer goods and would allow farmers to leave the collective farms. This struggle was given added impetus by the death of head of the Soviet Union Stalin and his denounciation by his successor Kruchshev in February 1956.

 

Throughout Eastern Europe, the Stalinists had expropriated capitalism after the war but created regimes that had no workers’ democracy and were instead ruled by Stalinist bureaucracies. Under Stalinism workers had been denied democratic rights including the right to strike or to form their own organsiations, and faced repression for criticising the regimes. In the factories, members of the party militia and trade unions policed workers, and suppressed any fightback against exploitation.

 

Krushchev’s speech gave the green light to the opposition in Eastern Europe to take to the streets. In June and July 1956, there were a series of strikes in Sepal and Budapest. On 28 July the workers of Poznan, Poland, demonstrated but were brutally fired upon by the internal security forces which killed 54 and wounded at least 300.

 

In Hungary it erupted again with the student demonstrations of October. “Now or never - Most vagy Soha - became one of the slogans of the uprising. The students presented 16 demands, including “New leadership, new direction, require new leaders!", “We shall not stop halfway - we will destroy Stalinism", and “Worker-peasant power!’. The masses also called for Imre Nagy, who had been expelled from the central committee at the beginning of the year, to be reinstated.

 

The 23 October demonstration moved to the radio station where the crowds wanted their demands broadcasted. There the AVH (secret political police) opened fire on the demonstrators who returned fire from arms provided by fraternising Hungarians troops.

 

Now Nagy appeared, after refusing to attend the demonstration. His speech to the crowd showed how alien his bureaucratic outlook was from that of the students and workers. He said: “It is by negotiation in the bosom of the party and by the discussion of problems that we will travel the road that leads toward the settlement of our conflicts. We want to safeguard constitutional order and discipline. The government will not delay in arriving at its decision."

 

Faced with a massive demonstration, active fraternisation between workers and soldiers, including soviet soldiers, and armed clashes with the AVH, the Stalinists called on Soviet troops to restore order in Budapest and declared martial law. They also called on Nagy to head a new government.

 

Meanwhile groups of workers were already doing battle with Soviet tanks on the streets of Budapest. Throughout the length and breadth of Hungary, the workers responded to the Soviet intervention with strike action. By 26 October, virtually all work had stopped. Moreover these days saw the formation of workers’ councils in every factory and mine and also the link up of those councils into the regional revolutionary committees in major industrial centres, such as Gyor and Miskolc.

 

The revolutionary committees of Gyor and Miskolc also controlled local radio stations and broadcasted messages of solidarity to the Soviet troops.

 

Miskolc declared: “Our people did not revolt against you, but for the achievement of legal demands. Our interests are identical. We and you are all fighting together for a better socialist life."

 

Gyor workers committee addressed soviet soldiers with: "Soviet soldiers! We the workers from the railroad factory in Gyor inform you that in our democratic state, workers are the guardians of the socialist achievements. That means with all their might, they are speaking out against returning factories and banks to the capitalists. At the same time we are against any Rakosite Stalinist restoration."

 

These statements were typical of the workers: on the one hand wanting to preserve socialism against the capitalists but also fighting for democratic and political rights against a military clampdown.

 

In most areas the workers’ councils busied themselves with local or factory problems involved in maintaining the general strike and giving critical support to Nagy. The leaders of the movement saw their committees as alternative local government but ceded central political power to Nagy and his reformist faction in the Communist Party.

 

While the working class base of the party and certain elements of its apparatus went over to the insurrection, its leading circles sought desperately to diffuse the crisis and re-establish bureaucratic rule - behind Soviet tanks.

 

The repression of the uprising

 

At the end of October, under the pressure of the masses the Stalinists appointed Imre Nagy as Prime Minister. The country had been brought to a standstill by a general strike. The masses had driven out the hated secret police, the ÁVH, and were demanding the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

 

The Soviet troops had been brought in swiftly from western Hungary to crush the uprising, evoking a non-existent clause of the Warsaw Treaty, but the soldiers quickly began fraternising with the locals. They had been in the country for some time and knew far more about the situation than the troops of the second intervention that were rushed in from Rumania. Many Soviet soldiers deserted to the Hungarians.

 

Each day the papers printed reports from the provinces that showed that the revolt was nationwide. Revolutionary councils were formed in the principle towns: Debrecen, Györ, Magyaróvár, Tatabánya, Miskolc, and Veszprém. Power was in the workers hands, as well as the railways, which refused to transport Soviet troops and supplies.

 

The Stalinists frantically tried to regain control as the Soviet intervention was falling apart. Then Nagy played the role he was brought in to play – to calm the situation, to call an end to the fighting, and to disarm the working class. He announced that the next election would be under the multi-party system; he called on the Soviet troops to withdraw from the capital and promised to begin negotiations for a complete withdrawal from the country. He recognised the organs set up by the revolution and asked for their support.

 

On 31 October, the fighting ended and the Soviet troops began to leave Budapest. The insurgents were releasing political prisoners – up to 5,500 were freed. Budapest began to look more like normal – the buses started running and work was beginning again in the large factories.

 

Although some budding revolutionary organisations, many formed from ex-members of the Communist Party, warned that the freedom fighters should not to lay down their arms until the demands of the revolution had been fully implemented, after a decade of severe state repression, their organisations were weak and they did not have the influence needed to lead the struggle.

 

The masses also believed that Nagy could resolve the issue of state power and so the workers’ councils refused to challenge him and the Stalinists for political power. The committees saw themselves as potential alternative local government but ceded central political power to Nagy.

 

At this point the effective power in Hungary was divided between the Nagy government and the armed people themselves, as represented and led by their national committees. It was dual power. But without a political party with a revolutionary programme that laid out in concrete terms the need for revolution, to struggle for power with the Nagy government, to call for “All Power to the Workers Councils”, to smash the stranglehold of the Stalinist bureaucrats and re-order society, the revolution would stall and eventually fail.

 

Nagy of course had no intention to resolve the question of power in the hands of the workers. “My friends, the revolution has been victorious,” he told a mass demonstration in front of the parliament on 31 October. He demobilised the people and lulled them into the belief that the struggle was over. Yet, at that moment, Nagy was in secret negotiations with Russian officers and their troops were already on their way back on the eve of 1 November.

 

Hungary was important for geo-political reasons, it was an important buffer for the Russians from the West, it was industrialised and had natural resources. But above all, if the they lost control of Hungary then revolutionary movements would spring up across all Soviet Republics, as was seen in Poland earlier in the year. It was necessary to repress the Hungarian uprising before the unravelling began.

 

On 2 November, the Soviet media launched an all-out attack against Nagy and the “clique of counter-revolutionaries who had come to power in Hungary”. On 4 November, after the Hungarian delegation had been arrested, the Soviet army launched a surprise attack on Budapest at dawn. Armed resistance was hastily organised but it was powerless to stop the Soviet forces.

 

Janos Kádár, the first secretary of the central committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (the re-named Stalinist party) announced that a new government had been formed which has appealed for the Soviet Union for military assistance: “The Hungarian Government of Revolutionary Workers and Peasants requests the assistance of the Soviet Army Command in helping our nation smash the forces of reaction and restore law and order to the country in the interest of our people, the working class and the peasantry.” Nagy sought political asylum in the Yugoslav embassy.

 

Despite a general strike and fierce street fighting against superior Soviet armoured units, the Soviet’s military intervention was effectively over by 10-11 November. Young workers accounted for 80 to 90 per cent of the wounded, while students represented 3 – 5 per cent. Nearly 20,000 Hungarians were killed and there was aerial bombardment of the major proletarian strongholds.

 

The workers tried to prolong the revolution by forming the Central Workers’ Council on 14 November, but it was too late – Stalinists had regained control and the repression began again. Thousands of people were sent to prison and Soviet forced labour camps. Some 2,00 people were executed.

 

The events of October and November 1956 in Hungary showed the workers’ and students’ will to fight when they took up arms against two Soviet military interventions. They toppled a hated Stalinist government and smashed the secret police, the ÁVH. They created workers and revolutionary councils that became the real power in every factory and most localities.

 

The workers organisations and the government were in a struggle for power and a dual power situation developed. The Hungarian revolution showed that without a revolutionary programme -and a political party to fight for it – the spontaneity of the masses could not develop a strategy to take power and the uprising was crushed.

 

The tragedy of the Hungarian revolution was that the workers were unable to create a revolutionary leadership and programme of action that could establish a government and take power to defend the political revolution and extend it to the rest of Eastern Europe and the USSR.

 

 

 

 

Revolutionär-Kommunistischen Organisation zur Befreiung (RKOB), 9. November 2011

 

 

 

Vor 55 Jahren, genauer gesagt im Oktober und November des Jahres 1956, fand in Ungarn ein Aufstand statt, der in seiner Größe zum damaligen Zeitpunkt eine Einmaligkeit darstellte. Noch nie zuvor in der Geschichte, hatte sich eine dermaßen breite Volksbewegung, noch dazu derart deutlich, gegen die stalinistische Unterdrückung in einem Ostblockland aufgelehnt. Es waren die ArbeiterInnen, Bauern und Bäuerinnen selbst - aber auch die StudentInnen -, die diese Bewegung vorwärts trieben, und eine verhaßte stalinistische Regierung zu Sturz brachten. Es kam zur Bildung von revolutionären ArbeiterInnen- und Bauernräten, die auch die meisten Fabriken und Agrosiedlungen kontrollierten. Leider aber endete diese hoffnungsvolle Massenbewegung in einem Meer von Blut, ohne viel bewirkt zu haben. Die Geschehnisse des Herbstes 1956 in Ungarn stellen sicherlich weit mehr dar, als nur die Auflehnung der Bevölkerung gegen eine ungeliebte Regierung, vielmehr waren sie eine der wenigen Chancen in der Geschichte der Arbeiterschaft in den stalinistischen Staaten Osteuropas die verhaßte, alles beherrschende Bürokratie durch die direkte Herrschaft der ProduzentInnen (ArbeiterInnen, Bauern und BäuerInnen) zu ersetzen.

 

Nach dem Tod Stalins im Jahre 1953, gab es einen gewissen Kurswechsel in Moskau. Die neue “kollektive” Führung (Troika) unter Malenkow, Chrustschow und Mikojan traute sich nicht, die Stalinsche Politik der äußerst harschen Konfrontation mit den ArbeiterInnen fortzusetzen. Letztlich braucht auch das stalinistische Terrorregime ein gewisses Ausmaß an Unterstützung oder zumindest Neutralität innerhalb der Massen. Folglich verkündete die neue Kremlführung eine (freilich limitierte) Lockerung der Repression, ein Aufholen der Konsumgüterindustrie gegenüber der Schwerindustrie und Zugeständnisse an jene Bauern und Bäuerinnen, die den Kollektivfarmen ablehnend gegenüberstanden.

 

In den osteuropäischen Ländern hielten die StalinistInnen seit dem Einmarsch der sowjetischen Armee in den letzten Kriegsjahren de facto den Staatsapparat in den Händen. Um ihre Macht nicht zu verlieren, sahen sie sich zu Beginn des Kalten Krieges Ende der 1940er Jahre gezwungen, den UnternehmerInnen die Betriebe wegzunehmen um mittels bürokratischer Wirtschaftspläne das kapitalistische Wertgesetz außer Kraft zu setzen. An dieser sozialen Revolution konnte die ArbeiterInnenklasse selbst nicht mitwirken - im Gegenteil, die StalinistInnen an den Schalthebel der Macht unterdrückten schon seit Kriegsende jede größere, eigenständige Bewegung der Massen. Das war auch der Grund, weshalb die Planwirtschaft an den realen Bedürfnissen und Möglichkeiten der arbeitenden Bevölkerung völlig vorbeiging, den utopischen Projekten der BürokratInnen (“Sozialismus in einem Land”) und den Privilegien der KP-Nomenklatur diente und daher zu ständigen Engpässen und Wirtschaftskrisen führte, deren Folgen dann erst recht wieder bürokratisch unterdrückt werden mußten.

 

Der “neue Kurs” in Moskau kam natürlich auch in den osteuropäischen Ländern zur Anwendung, nur hatte er dort weitreichendere Auswirkungen. Weshalb? Weil es in diesen Staaten eine unter Stalins Lebzeiten an den Rand gedrängte Fraktion innerhalb der stalinistischen KPs gab, die einen relativ unabhängigen Weg gegenüber Moskau gehen wollten. Ihr Vorbild war Titos Jugoslawien, das die Staatsmacht ja unabhängig von der sowjetischen Armee erobert hatte und daher nicht Wirtschaftsverträge mit der Sowjetunion, die eindeutig zum ökonomischen Vorteil Moskaus geschaffen wurden, eingehen mußte und keine Reparationszahlungen zu leisten hatten. Diese “national-stalinistischen” Fraktionen waren natürlich nicht weniger bürokratisch, erfreuten sich aber einer gewissen Popularität unter den Massen, weshalb sie auch in den Augen der Troika besser geeignet schienen, die stalinistische Herrschaft zu stabilisieren.

 

 

 

Ungarn Anfang der 1950er Jahre

 

 

 

In Ungarn wiederum war die “national-stalinistische” Fraktion extrem beliebt und Stalins Statthalter extrem unbeliebt. Das hängt damit zusammen, daß Ungarn bis in die 1940er Jahre vorwiegend ein Agrarland war und daher unglaubliche Arbeitshetze und politische Repression am Arbeitsplatz notwendig waren, um mittels des Arbeitsschweiß der ArbeiterInnen eine umfangreiche Schwerindustrie in nur wenigen Jahren aus den Boden zu stampfen. Viele Bauern und Bäuerinnen wurden in unproduktiven Kooperativen gezwungen und trauerten ihrer eigenen Scholle nach. Die Preise von landwirtschaftlichen Produkten wurden gemäß den Akkumulationsinteressen der Schwerindustrie festgelegt.

 

Es ist daher kein Zufall, daß der unbeliebteste Politiker dieser Zeit der “kleine Stalin” namens Rakosi war. Dieser lenkte die Geschicke der KP seit 1948, und führte das Land so nebenbei sozial in den Abgrund. Ihn völlig abzuservieren war der Moskauer Troika aber doch zu riskant und so einigte man sich 1953 darauf, als Zeichen der Erneuerung einen neuen Premier einzusetzen.

 

Dieser hieß Imre Nagy. Er konnte dem rechten Flügel innerhalb des Stalinismus zugeordnet werden, wurde aber bald zum Volksheld. Warum? Noch gar nicht lange im Amt, wurde er bereits 1955 wieder entlassen, und zog so das Wohlwollen der ArbeiterInnen und StudentInnen auf sich, sah man ihn doch als Rivalen des verhaßten Rakosi an. Abgesehen davon stand Nagys Unterschrift unter der ersten richtigen Bodenreform Ungarns kurz nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg. Den Adel und den Großgrundbesitz entmachtet zu haben - eine fortschrittliche bürgerliche Aufgabe, zu der das ungarische Bürgertum politisch immer zu schwach war - das vergaß die Landbevölkerung aber auch die “Bauern in Fabrikskittel” nicht.

 

 

 

Dem Aufstand entgegen

 

 

 

Große Wellen schlug damals auch der Fall “Rajk”. Rajk war innerhalb der ArbeiterInnenschaft relativ beliebt, weil er die ungarischen KP in der Illegalität während der deutschen Besatzung geleitet hatte, während sich Rakosi die Zeit im Moskauer Exil mit der Denunzierung von ArbeiterInnenführern an den Geheimdienst NKWD vertrieb. Die Popularität Rajks unter den ungarischen ArbeiterInnen ging der sowjetischen Führung dann doch zu weit, und er wurde nach Moskau ins “Exil” verfrachtet.

 

1954 wurde dann der sogenannte Petofi-Zirkel gegründet, ein offeneres Diskussionsforum, welches der bürokratischen Führung des Landes natürlich ein Dorn im Auge war. Also erzwang man - mit einer Welle von Verhaftungen - im Juni 1956 die Schließung des Petofi-Zirkels, der nachhaltig die Rede- und Pressefreiheit, sowie die Rückkehr Nagys in sein Amt gefordert hatte. Dies erzürnte natürlich auch die ArbeiterInnen.

 

Ermutigt durch die großen Streiks, die zur selben Zeit in Polen stattfanden, streikte man daraufhin auch in Budapest - und Moskau mußte erneut reagieren. Diesmal brachte man statt Rakosi einen gewissen Gero, der dessen bravster Gefolgsmann war.

 

Doch die ArbeiterInnen ließen sich nicht mehr täuschen: Am 6. Oktober war es soweit. Über 20.0000 Menschen demonstrierten für die Rückkehr Nagys nach Budapest. Rote Fahnen in den Händen der proletarischen Jugend waren zu sehen, und man konnte den Spruch lesen: “Wir werden erst aufgeben, wenn der Stalinismus zerstört ist”.

 

Und dann die Demonstration am 23. Oktober: Geführt vom Petofi-Zirkel, sang man die Internationale und forderte “Nagy an die Macht, Rakosi in die Donau”. Angesichts solcher Ausschreitungen, und insbesondere auch unter dem Gesichtspunkt der zunehmenden Verbrüderung zwischen ArbeiterInnen und Soldaten, hatte die ungarische KP akuten Handlungsbedarf, welcher sich folgendermaßen äußerte: Erstens forderte man Truppen vom großen Bruder aus Moskau an und zweitens brachte man Nagy tatsächlich erneut ins Amt, in der Hoffnung er könne die Massen alsbald beruhigen.

 

Aber nichts dergleichen war mehr möglich. Als die ungarischen Sicherheitskräfte unbewaffnete DemonstrantInnen aus dem Hinterhalt erschossen, strömte die Menge zu den Kasernen. Es bedurfte nicht langer Erklärungen, um die ungarischen Soldaten zu der Herausgabe von Waffen zu bewegen. Der Aufstand war ausgebrochen. Russische Panzer wurden losgeschickt, die auch auf Frauen und Kinder schossen, die sich um Brot anstellten.

 

Doch mitunter kam es anders. Denn auch die sowjetischen Soldaten waren nicht die blinden Kampfmaschinen, die sich Gero & Co. erhofft hatten. In der Erwartung, aus der Sowjetunion geschickt worden zu sein, um einen faschistischen Aufstand niederzuschlagen, mußte die Soldaten nur zu bald die Erfahrung machen, daß es sich hier um das pure Gegenteil handelte, nämlich um fortschrittliche, kämpfende ArbeiterInnen. Ein wichtiges Ereignis fand in dieser Hinsicht am 25. Oktober statt, als die sowjetischen Soldaten eine Gruppe jubelnder DemonstrantInnen zum Parlament geleitete und von den umliegenden Hausdächern durch ungarische Sicherheitskräfte beschossen wurden. Dabei starben 100 ZivilistInnen und russische Soldaten.

 

Mitunter wechselten selbst KP-Funktionäre die Fronten: Major Maleter, ein alter Spanienkämpfer, schilderte im Radio den Aufstands, den er mit seinen Truppen eigentlich niederschlagen hätte sollen: “Als ich dort hinkam, entdeckte ich, daß die Kämpfer für die Freiheit keineswegs Banditen sind, sondern vielmehr loyale Kinder Ungarns. Darum informierte ich das Verteidigungsministerium, daß ich mich den Aufständischen anschließen werde.” Ein anderes Mal sagte der Major: “Wenn wir die Russen endlich los sind, kehren wir sicher nicht zu den alten Zeiten zurück. Wir wollen nicht den Kapitalismus. In Ungarn wollen wir Sozialismus.” Diese Aussagen beweisen einmal mehr, daß die Aufständischen keineswegs „Agenten des Imperialismus“ oder „Faschisten“ waren (wie es die stalinistischen Bürokraten behaupteten), sondern für einen demokratischeren ArbeiterInnenstaat kämpften.

 

 

 

ArbeiterInnenräte

 

 

 

Ab 26. Oktober wurde die Arbeit total niedergelegt, Massenstreiks breiteten sich aus, was sehr bald zu Betriebsbesetzungen führte, um der Bürokratie ein Weiterlaufen der Fabriksmaschinen zu verunmöglichen. Spontan entstanden Koordinationsformen für diese Aufgaben: Räte. Auf dem flachen Land bildeten sich Bauern- und Bäuerinnenkomitees. Diese Räte und Komitees, die innerhalb kurzer Zeit überall in Ungarn aus dem Boden sprossen, waren das Herz der Revolution. Niemand konnte bisher flexiblere und effektivere Instrumente des Aufstandes “erfinden”, als es die Räte sind, in die die Massen KämpferInnen ihres Vertrauens entsandten.

 

Politisch gesehen waren die ungarischen Räte 1956 nicht geeint, sie stellten mitunter ziemlich unterschiedliche, auch lokale Forderungen auf. Das ist auch nicht verwunderlich, alles mußte schnell gehen, unmittelbare politische Erfahrungen gab es keine; von einer Partei, die den Aufstand angeleitet hätte, ganz zu schweigen. Insgesamt aber gab es innerhalb der Räte kaum Stimmen für eine Wiederherstellung des Kapitalismus oder ein Zurück hinter die Landreform.

 

Viele Forderungen waren eindeutig gegen die politische Repression durch den Stalinismus gerichtet (Rede- und Organisationsfreiheit), andere waren eher ein Reaktion gegen den bürokratischen Zentralismus in der Wirtschaft (Selbstverwaltung der Betriebe). Wandere Losungen forderten den Abzug der russischen Truppen sowie den Austritt Ungarns aus dem Warschauer Pakt - nationale Selbstbestimmung war neben den Kampf gegen die heimische stalinistische Repression überhaupt ein zentraler Motor.

 

Die Massen in Waffen und der politische Druck der Räte und Komitees zwangen die sowjetischen Truppen vorerst zum Abzug (31. Oktober). Ein erster Sieg für die Revolution.

 

 

 

Verrat und Niederlage

 

 

 

Trotz dieses enormen Potentials, hielten die Massen an einer - teilweise kritischen - Unterstützung für Nagy fest. Das ist auch nicht weiter verwunderlich, weil sich die Nagy-Fraktion – auch wenn sie ein überzeugter Stalinist war und somit dem System angehörte, das sie bekämpfen wollten – jahrelang innerhalb der KP-Bürokratie als Alternative gebärden konnte. Sie war ja auch nicht an der Macht gewesen und somit konnten die breiten Massen in der kurzen Zeit keine ausreichenden Erfahrungen mit ihr sammeln. Nun an die Macht gekommen, trieb die Nagy-Fraktion teils vor den Massen her (Nagy erklärte Ungarn für neutral und erkannte die Räte formal an), teils versuchte sie den Aufstand zu sabotieren (Nagy verkündete das Standrecht).

 

So benutzte Nagy das Vertrauen, das ihm von den Aufständischen entgegengebracht wurde. Aufgrund ihrer materiellen Lage als Teil der privilegierten Bürokratie wollte die Nagy-Führung natürlich nicht die erstarrte Bürokratie durch ArbeiterInnenräte ersetzen. Sie tat stattdessen das, was im Stalinismus immer bei solchen Gelegenheiten passiert: Um ja zu verhindern daß es zu einem gesunden ArbeiterInnenstaat kam, ging sie eine Koalition mit offen bürgerlichen und reaktionären Kräften ein. Am 27. Oktober präsentierte er seine neue Regierung, die zum Beispiel SozialdemokratInnen enthielt.

 

Gut möglich, daß dies als Fenster in Richtung Imperialismus gedacht war. Doch die ganze (auch internationale) Konstellation ließ in den 1950er Jahren eine Wiederherstellung des Kapitalismus noch nicht zu. Blieb für die ungarische KP (und ironischerweise auch für Nagy selbst!) nur Moskau.

 

Dafür mußte innerhalb der KP natürlich ein neuer Mann her - dieser hieß Kadar. Mit Hilfe neuer russischer Truppen aus Asien “normalisierte” er die Verhältnisse. Am 4. November beginnt die russische Armee einen konzentrierten Angriff auf Budapest. Die Revolution hat gegen diese Übermacht keine Chance und wird in die Defensive gedrängt.

 

Monatelang wehren sich noch die ungarischen ArbeiterInnen mit Streiks und passiven Widerstand. Am 14. November 1956 wird der „Zentrale Arbeiterrat von Budapest“ gegründet. Noch im Dezember ruft dieser Arbeiterrat zu einem 48-stündigen Generalstreik auf. Doch letztlich erstickte der Aufstand unter der Stahllawine sowjetischen Militärgeräts.

 

 

 

Fehlen einer revolutionären Partei

 

 

 

Der ungarische ArbeiterInnenaufstand 1956 war ein zentrales Ereignis der Nachkriegsgeschichte und einer der heroischsten Versuche des Proletariats, die grausame Herrschaft der stalinistischen Bürokratie zu stürzen und durch einen gesunden, sozialistischen ArbeiterInnenstaat zu ersetzen. Doch trotz der Entschlossenheit der Massen zum Kampf gegen die Bürokratie und der Schaffung von Räten der ArbeiterInnen und Bauern/Bäuerinnen endete die Revolution in einer Niederlage.

 

Die Hauptursache für diese Niederlage war das Fehlen einer revolutionären Partei. Die Massen waren spontan in der Lage, die Regierung zu stürzen und Räte aufzubauen. Doch spontan konnten sie natürlich nicht ein Programm der Errichtung der tatsächlichen Diktatur des Proletariats – also der Machtergreifung der ArbeiterInnenklasse und nicht der Kapitalisten oder der Bürokraten – entwickeln und die dafür notwendigen Taktiken ableiten. Ein solches Programm erfordert die wissenschaftliche Aufarbeitung der geschichtlichen Erfahrungen des internationalen Klassenkampfes, die Ausbildung von Kadern, die diese Lehren verstehen und in der Lage anzuwenden sind, und die im Proletariat verankert sind. Eine solche revolutionäre Partei existierte nicht und das war die fatale Schwäche der ungarischen Revolution.

 

Eine solche Partei hätte eine systematische Zersetzungsarbeit in der sowjetischen Armee eingeleitet, den Aufbau von ArbeiterInnen- und Bauernmilizen vorangetrieben und ein klares Programm der auf ArbeiterInnenräte und –milizen gestützten Regierung entwickelt. Sie hätte die Einheitsfronttaktik gegenüber der Fraktion Nagy betrieben und gleichzeitig vor deren unausweichlichen Verrat und Unzulänglichkeit gewarnt.

 

Die Revolutionär-Kommunistische Organisation zur Befreiung (RKOB) tritt für den Aufbau einer solchen revolutionären Partei ein. Wir können dem Heldenmut und dem sozialistischen Streben der ungarischen Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter am besten dadurch gedenken, im dem wir heute entschlossen und organisiert für die Sache der internationalen ArbeiterInnenrevolution kämpfen.

 

 

 

Anmerkung der Redaktion: Wir haben diesen Artikel erstmals in unserer damaligen Zeitung ArbeiterInnenstandpunkt im Oktober 2006 veröffentlicht und für diese Ausgabe überarbeitet und erweitert.